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We show that cryptocurrency markets are plagued by pump-and-dump manipulation, with at 
least 355 cases in seven months. Unlike stock market manipulators, cryptocurrency manipulators 
openly declare their intentions to pump specific coins, rather than trying to deceive investors. 
Puzzlingly, people join in despite negative expected returns. In a simple framework, we 
demonstrate how overconfidence and gambling preferences can explain participation in these 
schemes and find strong empirical support for both mechanisms. Pumps generate extreme price 
distortions of 65% on average, abnormal trading volumes in the millions of dollars, and large 
wealth transfers between participants. These manipulation schemes are likely to persist as long as 
regulators and exchanges turn a blind eye. 
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Cryptocurrencies have rapidly grown from a computer science curiosity to an asset class 
that is penetrating the traditional finance sector and the broader economy.
1
 Around $29 billion 
has been raised in the primary market for cryptocurrencies (initial coin offerings, ICOs) in just 
over five years.
2
 The secondary market for the approximately 7,000 cryptocurrencies generated 
around $100 trillion in trading volume in 2020.
3
 It is becoming increasingly important to 
understand cryptocurrency markets and the new challenges that they bring. 
Regulators and central banks have expressed serious concerns about the prevalence of 
pump-and-dump manipulation in cryptocurrency markets. In these pump-and-dump schemes, 
manipulators first take a long position in a security and then inflate its price (the pump) before 
unloading their long positions at inflated prices (the dump). A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report 
in 2018 exposed several examples of cryptocurrency pump-and-dump manipulation, claiming it 
accounts for millions of dollars of trading and showing examples of investors losing money in 
these schemes (Shifflett and Vigna, 2018). In the same year, the US Commodities and Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a public warning about pump-and-dump manipulation of 
cryptocurrencies. Widespread manipulation can damage the integrity of cryptocurrency markets, 
harm investor confidence, and impede adoption of the related financial innovations. 
We examine this new form of manipulation in cryptocurrency markets. First, we show 
that pump-and-dump manipulation in cryptocurrency markets is widespread and accounts for a 
substantial amount of cryptocurrency trading. Using hand collected data, we identify as many as 
355 cases of pump-and-dump manipulation in the space of seven months on two cryptocurrency 
exchanges. Up to 23 million individuals are involved in these manipulations. We estimate that 
the 355 pumps in our sample are associated with around $350 million of trading on the 
manipulation days and that manipulators extract profits of around $6 million from other 
participants. A total of 197 distinct cryptocurrencies or “coins” are manipulated, which means 
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 For example, Bitcoin futures contracts are traded on the major US derivatives exchanges like index and commodity 
futures. More than 500 “crypto funds” manage billions of dollars of investments in cryptocurrencies. 
Cryptocurrency exchange-traded fund proposals are being evaluated by regulators including the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. A number of central banks are issuing digital versions of their fiat currencies. A global 
consortium of major corporations led by Facebook has proposed a digital currency (Libra) intended to reach billions 
of users. Intercontinental Exchange (owner of the New York Stock Exchange) and the Swiss stock exchange are 
setting up their own digital/cryptocurrency exchanges. 
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 Source: ICOBench and Coinschedule. 
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 Source: Coinmarketcap, annualizing the October 2020 monthly volume. 
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about 15% of all coins in our sample of exchanges are targeted by manipulators at least once in 
the seven-month period. There are two pumps per day on average. This rate of manipulation is 
much higher than pump-and-dump manipulation in stock markets in recent decades.
4
 
Second, we show that while the pump-and-dump episodes tend to be rather short-lived, 
they generate extreme price distortions and abnormal volumes. The average cryptocurrency 
pump-and-dump manipulation is associated with a price rise of 65% in the space of minutes. 
These average returns are around four standard deviations of the daily cryptocurrency returns, so 
even after considering the high volatility of cryptocurrencies, pump-and-dump episodes generate 
extreme price distortions. On average, it takes about eight minutes for a pumped coin to reach its 
peak price, after which the dumping phase commences and the price collapses. The trading 
volume on manipulation days is around 13.5 times the usual daily volume. We also find spillover 
effects into other markets that trade the manipulated coins but that were not directly targeted by 
the manipulators: both volume and volatility increase significantly on these other markets during 
pumps. 
Interestingly, while pump-and-dump manipulation of cryptocurrencies is similar to 
pump-and-dump manipulation of stocks in some regards, it is completely different in others. The 
most important difference is that in cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps, manipulators typically 
make no pretense of having private information or claiming that a coin is undervalued, unlike 
typical stock market manipulations.
5
 Instead, pump group administrators (manipulators) publicly 
declare that they are pumping a given coin (releasing a “pump signal”) and call on others to 
join.
6
 Others then rush to buy the coin, presumably hoping to sell before the collapse of the 
pumped coin’s price. Economically, this means that manipulation schemes orchestrated by 
cryptocurrency pump groups do not exploit the classic mechanisms of information asymmetry 
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 Market manipulation in modern equity markets is significantly lower. For example, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) only 
identify 142 pump-and-dump cases on US stock exchanges in an 11-year period, which implies pump-and-dump 
rates in cryptocurrency markets are in the order of 40 times higher than for equity markets.   
5
 In conventional pump-and-dump schemes, manipulators try to convince investors to buy the stock by spreading 
positive news about the stock through e-mails, phone calls, newsletters, and claiming the stock has the potential for 
large gains. Prices rise as investors who are convinced by the manipulators’ promotional campaign buy the stock. 
After the manipulators’ promotional campaign is over, they sell their holdings, leading to a fall in the stock price 
(Leuz et al., 2017). 
6
 While this transparency of the manipulator’s intentions is a feature of the manipulations that we examine (those 
orchestrated by organized pump groups), it is likely that other forms of pump-and-dump manipulation also exist in 
cryptocurrency markets outside of these organized pump groups. These other forms may involve manipulators 
attempting to deceive other market participants into thinking a coin is undervalued, like the pump-and-dump 
manipulation that is found in stock markets.  
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and uncertainty about the fundamental value of an asset to “fool” market participants into buying 
a security. Nor do they exploit asymmetry in price impact, which underpins trade-based market 
manipulation. 
This novel feature of cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps raises two interesting questions. 
First, why do individuals participate in these pumps? Second, how are manipulators able to profit 
if they are neither fooling participants nor exploiting asymmetry in price impacts? We present a 
simple theoretical framework to address both of these questions. We show that rational 
individuals, absent a speed or skill advantage, would not participate in pump-and-dump 
manipulations because for participants other than the manipulator (who can buy ahead of the 
pump signal) pumps provide negative expected returns. The intuition is simple. Pumps are a 
zero-sum game involving re-distributions of wealth between players. Given that manipulators 
use their advantage to extract a profit, and given the existence of trading costs, pumps become a 
negative-sum game for participants other than the manipulator. While the fastest or most skilled 
participants can profit at the expense of slower or less skilled participants, non-manipulators in 
aggregate lose money, presenting a puzzle of how these pumps can sustain participation. 
We use the framework to illustrate two types of individuals that would willingly take part 
in pumps, despite the unattractive returns. The first type is overconfident individuals that 
overestimate their ability to sell at a price close to the peak. From their perspective, pumps 
(incorrectly) seem like a profitable game ex-ante. The second type is individuals that use pumps 
as a form of gambling, attracted by the possibility of large gains and the right-skewed payoff 
distribution that pumps can generate under certain conditions.  
We find strong empirical support for both of these explanations. We estimate regressions 
of pump participation on measures of overconfidence and gambling. The overconfidence proxy 
that we use is based on the tendency for past success to increase overconfidence through the self-
attribution bias. The gambling proxy measures the level of gambling in cryptocurrency-based 
gambling services (such as SatoshiDICE), normalized by the level of cryptocurrency activity. 
The results show that overconfidence and gambling are statistically significant and economically 
meaningful determinants of the amount of participation in cryptocurrency pumps. The 
magnitudes of both mechanisms are similar. Therefore, we conclude that cryptocurrency pump-
and-dumps are, to a large extent, a type of trading game that attracts overconfident traders and 
people looking for a gamble. 
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Despite functioning as a type of trading game, cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps are 
nevertheless a form of market manipulation as they involve a deliberate intention on the part of 
the manipulator to influence the price of a traded security. These schemes therefore not only 
expose unwitting and naïve investors to being exploited by manipulators but are also likely to 
involve similar costs as other forms of manipulation. For example, a loss of confidence in the 
integrity of markets, which can inhibit the growth of cryptocurrency markets since institutional 
investors are likely to steer clear of markets with such widespread manipulation. 
We also examine the characteristics of coins that are most likely to be targeted by 
manipulators and we test how manipulation affects those coins. We find that manipulators target 
relatively illiquid coins. This observation is consistent with our framework, which predicts 
individuals will be more attracted to pumps of illiquid coins. However, the most illiquid coins 
have a lower likelihood of manipulation, which is probably because a minimum level of liquidity 
is required to make the pump feasible and worthwhile on the part of manipulators who need to 
build positions in the coin before sending a pump signal.  
Finally, we find that although pumps create extreme price distortions during the pump, 
prices revert back to their pre-pump levels within one or two days (often within an hour) 
following the manipulation. Therefore, pumps do not appear to have a permanent impact on the 
value of a targeted coin. The price distortions created by pumps are larger in less liquid coins and 
when more individuals participate in the pump. Through time, pumps tend to speed up; they take 
less time to reach the peak price from the time the pump signal is sent. 
There are many potential benefits from the cryptocurrency ecosystem. A contribution of 
our paper is to increase our understanding of the downsides so that the sector can be efficiently 
regulated, rather than shut down entirely. For example, initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a 
promising new way to raise capital—see Cong, Li, and Wang (2018, 2020) and Li and Mann 
(2020) for models that show the benefits of using digital tokens. Howell, Niessner and Yermack 
(2019) find that platforms that list their tokens on exchanges post-ICO tend to be more 
successful, suggesting that a secondary market contributes to the success of token-based 
platforms. Our results suggest that, without regulation and enforcement, widespread 
manipulation will prevail in cryptocurrency secondary markets. Widespread manipulation can 
harm confidence in cryptocurrencies and tokens and impede their growth and adoption. 
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Therefore, without proper regulation and enforcement of manipulation, some of the benefits of a 
token-based ecosystem might remain unrealized.  
Our paper also contributes to the market manipulation literature by characterizing a new 
form of manipulation that differs from typical cases of pump-and-dump manipulation in stock 
markets.
7
 Aggarwal and Wu (2006) provide a thorough analysis of stock market pump-and-
dumps. The cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps that we examine exploit mechanisms that are quite 
different to those in typical stock market manipulations. There are also data advantages in 
analyzing cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps. For example, we can observe the exact start times 
for the pumps (when the pump group releases the “pump signal” to participants) and our sample 
is not contaminated by a prosecution bias as we obtain data on manipulations irrespective of 
whether they are prosecuted.
8
 The cryptocurrency markets that we analyze are electronic limit-
order-book markets like most of the world’s equity and derivatives exchanges. Thus, our 
findings about market manipulation can be useful for equity and derivatives markets as well. 
Four contemporaneous papers also analyze pump-and-dump manipulation in 
cryptocurrency markets. Li, Shin, and Wang (2020) characterize the impact of pumps-and-dump 
schemes on cryptocurrency markets. Xu and Livshits (2019) and Kamps and Kleinberg (2018) 
develop approaches to predict cryptocurrency pumps ex-ante and ex-post, respectively. Lastly, 
Hamrick et al. (2020) examine the factors that affect price jumps in cryptocurrency pumps. 
While these four studies and our paper have some findings in common, our study has a different 
focus. For example, like our paper, Hamrick et al. (2020) and Li et al. (2020) find that coins with 
lower market capitalization have larger price jumps during pumps. Similar to our paper, Li et al. 
(2020) also find that these schemes are widespread, generate large but short-lived price 
distortions, and result in substantial wealth transfers between market participants. A novel 
feature of their analysis is testing the causal effects of these schemes on liquidity. Somewhat 
surprisingly, they find that these schemes decrease the liquidity of cryptocurrency markets.  
In contrast, the focus of our paper is on modelling and testing the mechanisms that enable 
these schemes to exist in the first place and analyzing how they sustain participation. 
Theoretically, we show that two behavioral factors—overconfidence and gambling 
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 For reviews of the market manipulation literature, see Fox, Glosten, and Rautherberg (2018) and Putniņš (2020). 
8
 In contrast, the stock market manipulation prosecution cases that an empiricist can work with are a non-random 
“tip of the iceberg” For example, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014) show that prosecuted cases of manipulation 
reflect a tiny and non-random fraction (0.3%) of all manipulation.  
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preferences—can explain pump participation and we find empirical support for both of these 
behavioral factors. We also provide further characterization of these schemes beyond what is in 
the other studies, showing their impact on the manipulated market as well as spillovers to other 
markets and identifying the characteristics of coins most susceptible to such manipulation.  
This paper is also related to two recent studies of other forms of cryptocurrency market 
manipulation. In both cases, the (alleged) perpetrators of market manipulation are cryptocurrency 
exchanges or parties associated with them. Griffin and Shams (2020) show that parties related to 
the cryptocurrency exchange Bitfinex used Tether (a USD-pegged cryptocurrency) to inflate the 
price of Bitcoin. Gandal et al. (2018) examine Bitcoin trading in 2013 and argue that fraudulent 
transactions conducted by the Mt. Gox exchange caused the Bitcoin price to rise by more than 
500% in two months.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on pump-and-dump 
groups and the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Section 3 discusses existing market manipulation 
theories and develops a simple new framework of cryptocurrency pumps. Section 4 details the 
empirical tests and results. Section 5 discusses the welfare effects of cryptocurrency pumps. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional setting 
2.1 Illustration of a cryptocurrency pump-and-dump manipulation 
To explain the mechanics of a pump, we provide an illustration of a pump by the Big 
Pump Signal (BPS) group, one of the largest pump groups by number of members (around 
63,000 members on Telegram at the time of writing). This pump was on the Binance exchange 
and involved the cryptocurrency ChatCoin (CHAT). Figure 1 displays communication from BPS 
administrators to its members about the CHAT pump. First, the administrators announce the 
exchange, date, and time at which the pump will occur, but not the actual coin that will be 
pumped (top left-hand-side message in Figure 1). This pre-announcement of the pump prepares 
participants, allowing them to transfer funds to the nominated exchange and be online and 
waiting for the pump signal at the pre-specified time. 
Then comes the “pump signal”, which is just the name of the coin being pumped (bottom 
left-hand-side message in Figure 1). In this illustration, the coin being pumped is “CHAT”, as 
indicated by the red dashed line around the text “CHAT” (the format is intended to prevent 
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machine readability of the message content). BPS sent the pump signal for the CHAT pump at 
20:00:23 GMT on June 10, 2018.  
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
Figure 2 Panel A shows the price of CHAT in fifteen-second intervals starting 15 minutes 
prior to the release of the pump signal and ending 90 minutes after the pump signal. Figure 2 
Panel B shows the trading volume of CHAT in five-minute intervals during the same period. 
There is very little trading activity in the 15 minutes leading up to the pump signal and a sudden 
jump in the price and trading volume immediately after the pump signal at 20:00. Although the 
price fluctuates a lot during and after the pump, it peaks at around 17 seconds after the pump 
signal is sent (Panel C zooms in to the five minutes around the pump signal). The peak price is 
approximately 55% above the pre-pump price level. Following the peak, the price and volume of 
CHAT remain elevated until about one hour after the pump signal, at which time the price falls 
back down to around the pre-pump price level.  
In addition to the extreme price movements, the pump is associated with a significant 
spike in trading volume. In the half hour before the pump signal is sent, the trading volume in 
CHAT is $17,313.47 (or 2.55 BTC), which is likely to be pre-pump position building by 
manipulators (the group administrators).
9
 In the half hour after the pump signal is released, the 
trading volume in CHAT jumps to $2.69 million, which is 3.6 times the median daily dollar 
volume for CHAT between December 2017 and July 2018.  
 
< Figure 2 here > 
 
2.2 Pump-and-dump groups 
BPS provides a nice illustration of how pump-and-dump groups operate. Most groups 
communicate with their members on one of two instant messaging platforms, Telegram and 
Discord. BPS uses both. A unique feature of these messaging platforms is that they allow users 
to form public groups in which only the administrator of the group can broadcast messages to the 
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 BTC denotes the unit of measurement for Bitcoin. Most cryptocurrencies are traded in BTC pairs. 
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members of the group. These groups are public insofar as any Discord or Telegram user can find 
and join these groups.  
Most messages sent by group administrators fit into one of four categories. The first 
category is messages that convey information about pumps, such as details about the 
date/time/exchange of upcoming pumps, the coin being pumped, or pump results. The second 
category is messages that provide guidance on how pumps work and how members can profit 
from pumps. The right-hand side message in Figure 1 provides an example in which the group’s 
administrators advise members to enter the pump as soon as possible and dump their holdings on 
outsiders, such as technical traders that might buy the coin based on the upward price 
movements. The third category is success stories of people profiting from pumps. It is likely that 
these success stories are intended to encourage participation by creating the perception of large 
potential profits. Lastly, the fourth category is messages that advertise the opportunity to become 
a paid member of the group. Paid members (as distinct from the individuals that follow the group 
messages at no cost) are provided pump-related information (e.g., the coin name) in advance of 
the general broadcast to all group members, allowing them to take positions in coins ahead of the 
official pump signal.  
Unlike conventional pump-and-dump manipulation, where manipulators typically try to 
mislead market participants into thinking the manipulated security is fundamentally undervalued 
(Leuz et al., 2017), in cryptocurrency pumps like the one illustrated above, the manipulators’ 
goal is to convince people to participate in the pump. Cryptocurrency manipulators typically do 
not seek to trick people into believing that a coin is mispriced on the basis of fundamentals—
they explicitly communicate to the pump group members that a coin is being pumped, as 
opposed to representing a great investment opportunity. We randomly sample 70 of the pumps 
and manually categorize each of the messages sent to the pump group members. In none of the 
70 cases is there any suggestion that the target coin is undervalued.  
Although manipulators are explicit in telling their group members about the intention to 
pump, they may also hope to attract others, such as technical traders, to buy the manipulated coin 
following the initial sharp increase in price. As an example, the message in Figure 1 urges pump 
group members to hold for a long period so that outsiders have a chance to get in and “we can all 
profit.” Such messages can appear in isolation as general “how to pump better” messages or 
accompany the pump signal.  
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In the sample of 70 pump messages that we manually categorize, we find that 27 of them 
(39%) urge participants to hold the coin for longer to attract outsiders to the pump. This feature 
of the schemes adds to the uncertainty about how many traders will be drawn to participate in the 
pump and consequently at what point the pump will peak. We show later that this uncertainty is 
crucial in attracting overconfident traders that overestimate their ability to exit at close to the 
peak price and in attracting gamblers as the uncertainty creates volatility in the outcomes. 
 
2.3 Cryptocurrency markets and regulation 
Why is such manipulation conducted so openly in cryptocurrency markets? The answer 
to this question is four-fold. First, cryptocurrency exchanges are underequipped to detect and 
prevent most forms of market manipulation, including pump-and-dump schemes. The Office of 
the New York State Attorney General (ONYSAG), the highest law office in the state of New 
York in the US, confirms this in a recent investigation into cryptocurrency exchanges.
10
 Out of 
the ten exchanges investigated, only four have formal policies defining actions that constitute 
manipulative activity. Surprisingly, none of the exchanges have adequate market surveillance 
methods to detect manipulation, and only two exchanges are working on implementing better 
surveillance tools. The lack of supervision by exchanges may be an issue of incentives—by 
turning a blind eye to manipulation, they generate higher trading volumes from the presence of 
manipulation schemes, thereby increasing their revenue from fees. However, the previous 
literature suggests that competition between exchanges ensures that exchanges have an incentive 
to curb market manipulation since they stand to lose potential income if traders wary of 
manipulation take their trades elsewhere (e.g., Easterbrook, 1986; Daniel and David, 1991). 
Second, there is virtually no action from regulators or law enforcement agencies to 
counter these cryptocurrency pump-and-dump schemes. Currently, the only regulatory 
recognition of these schemes is a notice from the US Commodities and Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) advising the public to be wary of pump-and-dump manipulation on 
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 The ONYSAG conducted an in-depth investigation into the working practices of ten cryptocurrency exchanges: 
Bitfinex, Bitflyer, Bitstamp, Bittrex, Coinbase, Gemini, Hbus, Itbit, Poloniex, and Tidex. Among the exchanges with 
known instances of pump-and-dump manipulation (Yobit, Cryptopia, and Binance), one exchange (Binance) was 
contacted by the Attorney General’s office to join the investigation. Binance, however, refused to participate stating 
that their exchange does not allow trading from New York. ONYSAG conducted a preliminary investigation into 
whether Binance operated in New York and referred them to the New York Department of Financial Services for 




cryptocurrency exchanges and announcing a reward for whistleblowers who report 
manipulators.
11
 This lack of attention from exchanges and regulators implies that 
cryptocurrencies are vulnerable to market manipulation.  
The last two factors that enable cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps are increasing 
participation of the public in cryptocurrency markets and strong speculative sentiment among 
participants. Both of these factors ensure that there is no shortage of people from whom 
manipulators can extract profits. Cryptocurrency markets have witnessed a significant rise in 
trading activity recently, with trading volume in 2018 exceeding the total trading volume in the 
preceding five years. Investors entering cryptocurrency markets could increase participation in 
cryptocurrency pumps, as manipulators can attract a bigger audience into their pump groups. 
Previous research shows that price movements in cryptocurrencies have a sizeable speculative 
component (Cheah and Fry, 2015). Previous research also shows that speculation-driven 
investors have a higher tendency to participate in pump-and-dump schemes (Leuz et al., 2017).  
In summary, cryptocurrency pump-and-dump manipulations occur openly in 
cryptocurrency markets because these markets have little oversight by regulators and exchanges, 
high levels of investor speculation, and a growing pool of participants.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 Existing theories 
Cryptocurrency pumps-and-dump manipulations cannot be explained by existing market 
manipulation theories. The two main types of manipulation that have been modelled theoretically 
are information-based manipulation and trade-based manipulation (Putniņš, 2012). Information-
based manipulation involves spreading false information about the value of the security in the 
hope that traders will believe the false information (Vila, 1989; Van Bommel, 2003). 
Information-based manipulation theories require uncertainty about the fair value of a security 
and information asymmetry as underpinnings of the manipulation (Van Bommel, 2003). If there 
is little or no uncertainty about the fair value, or no information asymmetry, then uninformed 
traders will not act on the rumors or false information circulated by manipulators.  
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 This advisory statement can be found at this link (https://bit.ly/2NH3wj0). 
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Trade-based manipulation involves manipulating the price of a security by buying and 
then selling or vice versa. Allen and Gale (1992) show that successful trade-based manipulation 
can occur if non-manipulators believe that the manipulator is an informed trader and follow the 
manipulator by trading in the same direction. Such manipulation also requires uncertainty about 
the fair value of a security and information asymmetry. Additionally, Allen and Gorton (1992) 
and Jarrow (1992) respectively show that asymmetry in liquidity-motivated trading and price 
momentum can both drive trade-based manipulation.  
Cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps, like the one illustrated in the previous section, do not 
fit well into either of the two existing market manipulation theories. Manipulators in 
cryptocurrencies trigger the pump-and-dump episodes through an information release (the pump 
signal) rather than through buying or selling and as such the manipulation is not trade-based.  
Yet, the information that is released is not false information about the value of the security as is 
typical of information-based manipulation. Rather, the information reveals the intended 
manipulation. Therefore, neither information asymmetry nor uncertainty about the fair value is 
exploited in cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps, in contrast to typical cases of information-based 
manipulation. The data support these arguments: we find that the probability of a pump-and-
dump manipulation is not higher when there is more uncertainty about a coin’s value as proxied 
by lagged volatility of the coin (Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix). Therefore, a new 
framework is needed to explain the mechanics of cryptocurrency pumps.  
 
3.2 A framework for cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps 
We model cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps as a four-period, simultaneous-move trading 
game. There are three agents: a manipulators (pump group administrators), traders that can 
choose to participate in the pump following the release of a pump signal, and a simple market 
maker that facilitates trades.  
The game starts in Period 0 when a manipulator or a group of manipulators decides to 
pump a particular coin. The price of the coin at the time is 𝑃0.  
In Period 1, the manipulators take a long position of 𝑀 units (𝑀 > 1) in the coin and 
send a message to their pump group members stating there will be a pump in Period 2 (without 
releasing the name of the coin, as per the previous example of a typical pump). The 𝑀 units can 
13 
 
be thought of as 𝑀 manipulators each buying one unit of the coin or one manipulator buying 𝑀 
units of the coin.  
We assume market orders have linear price impacts, consistent with microstructure 
models of market making (Kyle, 1985). A further motivation for linear price impacts is that they 
rule out simple trade-based manipulation strategies that could otherwise make unlimited profits 
simply by buying and selling (e.g., Huberman and Stanzl, 2004). The anecdotal evidence 
discussed previously suggests that cryptocurrency pumps do not seek to exploit non-linearity or 
asymmetry in price impacts. We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that price impacts are 
symmetric in our empirical data.
12
 Therefore, prices are determined by the function, 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝑥𝑡, where 𝑃𝑡 is the price in period 𝑡, 𝛽 is a price impact parameter between zero and one, and 𝑥𝑡 
is the net volume of buys (buys minus sells) received by the market at time 𝑡. Cumulating the net 
volume received up to time 𝑡, 𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝜏
𝜏=𝑡
𝜏=1  the pricing function can be rewritten as 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃0 +
𝛽𝑋𝑡. At the end of Period 1, after the manipulators have bought 𝑀 units, pushing the price up 
𝑀𝛽, the price of the coin is 𝑃1 = 𝑃0 + 𝑀𝛽. 
In Period 2, the manipulators send the pump signal to the 𝑁 > 1 members of their pump 
group, notifying them of the coin being pumped. These 𝑁 members each simultaneously decide 
whether to participate in the pump (buy one unit of the coin) or not participate (no trade). We 
restrict trade sizes to one unit to keep the framework simple and focus on the participation 
decision. Players that decide to participate in the pump race to submit their unit market buy 
orders to the market. Matching engines in financial markets, including cryptocurrency 
exchanges, typically process incoming orders sequentially by placing them in a queue. 
Therefore, small random latencies in order submission determine the queue position or sequence 
in which the orders of participants are executed by the market. These random latencies include 
the time taken to receive and interpret the pump signal, to make a decision, to enter the order, 
and for the order to be transmitted to the market. The individual participants will buy at prices 
{(𝑃1 + 1𝛽), (𝑃1 + 2𝛽), … } depending on their random latency, which determines their queue 
position. If 𝑁′ players choose to participate, having a combined price impact of 𝑁′𝛽, the price at 
the end of Period 2 (which is the price paid by the participant whose order arrives at the market 
last) will be 𝑃2 = 𝑃1 + 𝑁′𝛽 = 𝑃0 + 𝑀𝛽 + 𝑁′𝛽.  
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 We test whether price impacts are symmetrical in our data by calculating the Amihud illiquidity ratio (Amihud, 
2002) in 30 minute intervals and comparing the measure for price increases and decreases. Illiquidity ratios for price 
increases are not statistically different to the ratios for price decreases at the 5% significance level. 
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Conditional on participation, in Period 3, players exit the pump (along with the 
manipulator) by simultaneously submitting unit volume market sell orders. These orders are 
executed in the same way as the entry orders: random latencies determine the queue positions 
and execution prices. To keep things simple, we assume the exit queue position is independent of 
the entry queue position. Therefore, in Period 3, the individual sell orders are executed at prices 
{(𝑃2 − 1𝛽), (𝑃2 − 2𝛽), … , 𝑃0} depending on their random latency and queue position. The price 
at the end of Period 3 (which is the price received by the participant whose order arrives at the 
market last) will be 𝑃3 = 𝑃0 because once the manipulators and all pump participants have 
liquidated their long positions, the cumulative net volume of buys, 𝑋3, is zero. 
Figure 3 illustrates the timing and price dynamics in this simple framework under 
different parameter values. In the baseline illustration (𝑃0 = $5, 𝑀 = 10, 𝑁′ = 100, 𝛽 = 0.2), 
the price starts at 𝑃0 = $5 and rises to 𝑃1 = $7 once the manipulators buy 10 units. The price 
rises further to 𝑃2 = $27 once the 100 pump group participants buy, with 𝑃2 being the peak price 
of the pump. Finally, the price falls back down to 𝑃3 = $5 once the manipulators and 
participants exit the pump. With a larger number of manipulators (higher 𝑀), there is a larger 
run-up in Period 1 before the pump signal is sent and consequently also a higher peak price. With 
a larger number of pump participants (higher 𝑁′) there is a sharper price rise in Period 2 and a 
higher peak. When there is less liquidity and a higher price impact parameter (𝛽), there is a 
larger run-up in Period 1 before the pump signal is sent and a sharper price rise after the signal as 
participants buy the coin. 
< Figure 3 here > 
 
3.3 Who participates in pumps? 
What types of individuals would choose to participate in cryptocurrency pump-and-
dumps? We start by showing that it is puzzling why individuals would choose to participate in 
pumps given that the expected return to pump participants in aggregate is negative. We then 
show that a systematic skill or speed advantage could explain why some individuals participate, 
shifting the puzzle to the less skilled or slower participants. Lastly, we show that a preference for 
skewness (gambling preferences) and/or overconfidence can explain the remainder of the 
participation puzzle.  
15 
 
Start with the simple case of homogenous participants with correct beliefs and consider 
the prices at which a participant expects to buy and sell the coin. Recall that the manipulators 
buy 𝑀 units before sending the pump signal, driving the price to 𝑃1 = 𝑃0 + 𝑀𝛽 just before the 
pump signal is released. If all 𝑁 pump group members choose to participate, they buy the coin at 
prices {(𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 1)), (𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 2)), … , (𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 𝑁))} depending on their random 
latency. Thus, their “entry prices” (𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦) are uniformly distributed from 𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 1) to 
𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 𝑁). Similarly, their “exit prices” at which they sell the coin in Period 3 (𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡) are 
uniformly distributed from 𝑃0 (once all positions are liquidated there are zero net cumulative 
buys) to 𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 𝑁 − 1), which is the highest price received by the first seller following the 
peak.
13
 Therefore, individual 𝑖’s expected profit is:  
𝔼[𝜋𝑖] = 𝔼[𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦] = −
𝛽(𝑀+2)
2
 .    (1) 
Both 𝛽 and 𝑀 are strictly positive and so the expected return, 𝔼[𝜋𝑖], is negative. The 
expected loss has two components: the round-trip trade cost (𝛽), and the expected loss to the 
manipulator which is half the manipulator’s initial price impact (𝛽𝑀/2).  
In contrast, manipulators have an advantage over others by being able to buy the coin 
ahead of the pump signal, effectively getting a more advantageous entry price than their 
followers. Therefore, pumps can have positive expected profits for manipulators as long as there 




(𝑁′ − 2𝑀),      (2) 
which is positive if 𝑁′ > 2𝑀.  
So, while it is clear that manipulation can be profitable for manipulators, other pump 
participants should expect to lose money in aggregate—collectively, they lose the sum of their 
transaction costs (𝛽𝑁′) and the gross profits of manipulators (𝛽𝑀𝑁′/2). Intuitively, a rational 
individual with correct beliefs would recognize that a cryptocurrency pump-and-dump is a zero 
sum game across all participants including the manipulator, in the absence of trading costs. 
Positive trading costs and the wealth transfer to the manipulator make it a negative-sum game for 
participants other than the manipulator. Therefore, risk averse or risk neutral rational individuals 
                                                          
13
 Technically, the entry and exit prices follow discrete uniform distributions. However, given there are typically 
many participants in pumps (𝑁′ in the hundreds or thousands), the continuous distribution is a reasonable 
approximation and allows us to obtain a tractable solution.    
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with correct beliefs and no advantage over others would choose not to participate in these pump-
and-dump games. 
 
Result 1: Rational individuals with correct beliefs do not participate in cryptocurrency pump-
and-dumps. 
 
But what if participants are not homogenous and instead some are faster or more skilled 
than others? Some participants might be able to systematically react faster than others, or might 
have lower latencies in getting orders filled at the exchange, or they simply might be better at 
“picking the peak” and sensing when the pump is about to enter the dump phase. In effect they 
would be able to buy at a lower price soon after the release of the pump signal and sell at a 
higher price soon after the pump peaks.  
To incorporate this heterogeneity into the framework, we allow for fast and slow players 
by tilting the exit price distribution of fast (/slow) players toward higher (/lower) prices (tilting 
the entry prices as well would merely strengthen the effect). We introduce a speed parameter, 𝑆𝑖, 
that is the slope of the transformed exit price pdf for player 𝑖. For fast players, 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑠
∗ > 0 
whereas for slow players, 𝑆𝑖 = −𝑠
∗ < 0 when there are equal proportions of fast and slow 









     if     𝑃0 ≤ 𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 𝑁′ − 1)   
 
0                                                                          otherwise                                                    
     (3) 
The tilted pdfs are illustrated in Figure 4. The extent of the tilt (magnitude of 𝑠∗) 
determines the magnitude of the difference in speed or skill. In any given pump, players still face 
uncertainty around their exit price, creating the possibility of profits or losses from any given 
pump. But the tilted distributions of exit prices favor the fast players, allowing them to sell at 
higher prices on average, such that they earn higher payoffs from pumps on average. 
 
< Figure 4 here > 
 
Unsurprisingly, a fast (slow) player earns higher (lower) expected profits than an 
“average” participant (e.g., 𝔼[𝜋𝑖] in Eqn. (1)). The expected profit for fast (slow) players is 
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higher (lower) than for an average participant by 
𝛽3𝑆𝑖
2
(𝑀 + 𝑁 − 1)3. Manipulator profits remain 
unchanged and therefore the increased expected profit of fast participants is at the expense of 
slow participants. Fast participants earn positive expected profits when they have a sufficiently 




There are two interpretations of these results. First, it could be that participants know 
their type (fast or slow). In this case, it is rational for sufficiently fast participants (with 
sufficiently low risk aversion) to participate in pumps. They may not profit from every pump, but 
under the conditions given above, they face positive expected returns. This shifts the puzzle of 
why people participate in pumps to the slow participants. In fact, participation becomes more 
puzzling because, in the presence of fast participants, the slower individuals face even worse 
expected losses from participating in pumps. 
A second interpretation is that participants do not know their speed or skill relative to 
others. In this case, the puzzle of participation that we described for the homogenous case 
remains. For example, with an equal proportion of fast and slow participants (implying 
symmetric tilts of the exit price distributions), a participant’s expected exit price distribution if 
they do not know their type is uniform just like in the case of homogenous participants, resulting 
in negative expected returns. Intuitively, if a participant does not know their speed or skill 
relative to others, they can expect a random share of the aggregate outcomes of participants, 
which are losses equal to the aggregate trading costs plus the manipulator’s gross profit. So, 
while the heterogeneity in speed potentially explains why some individuals willingly participate 
in pumps, it remains a puzzle as to why less skilled participants or participants that do not know 
their skill level participate in pumps. 
To resolve this puzzle of participation, we propose two behavioral explanations.  
First, we consider overconfidence, which can give individuals the perception of having 
an advantage over others. A large literature in psychology and behavioral finance shows that 
most people (including financial market participants) assess their own abilities as being higher 
than those of the average person (Barber and Odean, 2000; Gervais and Odean, 2001; Alicke and 
Govorun, 2005; Deaves, Lüders and Luo, 2008). This is known as the better-than-average effect. 
In cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps, an overconfident individual that believes they are more 
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skilled than the average player could expect to enter and exit pumps faster than the average 
participant and therefore obtain more favorable prices, much like the fast individuals above.  
To model this overconfidence effect, we return to the baseline of homogenous individuals 
and add a bias to the perceived distribution of exit prices for overconfident individuals. This bias 
can be interpreted as individuals believing they are better than average in “picking the peak” of 
the pump and exiting at a higher price than the average participant. Let the overconfidence 
parameter, 𝑖










     if     𝑃0 ≤ 𝑃𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑃0 + 𝛽(𝑀 + 𝑁′ − 1)   
 
0                                                                          otherwise                                                    
     (4) 
The overconfidence bias, 𝑖
 , tilts the distribution to increase the perceived probability of exiting 
the pump at a high price. 
Replacing the unbiased exit price distribution with the biased one, we find that the 






𝑚𝑖𝑛.           (5) 
The condition in (5) implies that cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps have positive expected 
payoffs for sufficiently overconfident individuals. Assuming risk neutrality, individuals with 
overconfidence exceeding the threshold,  
𝑚𝑖𝑛, would participate in pumps. We therefore arrive 
at the first possible explanation for why individuals participate in cryptocurrency pump-and-
dumps. 
 
Result 2: Sufficiently overconfident individuals participate in cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how the minimum overconfidence threshold varies with the other 
parameters. For the illustration, we set values for two of three of the parameters and plot  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 
against the third parameter. Panel A shows that  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 is decreasing in 𝛽, implying that pumps of 
less liquid coins (higher price impact parameter, 𝛽) tend to have more participation from 
overconfident individuals due to the lower minimum overconfidence required to induce 
participation. This effect occurs because less liquid coins tend to have a higher dispersion of exit 
prices (higher pre-pump to peak return). Consequently, a smaller bias is required in the perceived 
probability of being able to exit the pump near the peak to make the pump attractive to an 
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overconfident individual. This effect also provides an explanation for why pumps tend to occur 
in relatively illiquid coins. Panel B shows that  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 is increasing in 𝑀, implying that pumps with 
more manipulator participation tend to have less participation from overconfident players. This 
effect occurs because manipulators impose a cost (losses equivalent to manipulator gains) on 
other participants, so a greater perceived ability to exit near the peak price (higher 
overconfidence) is required to make the pump attractive. Finally, Panel C shows that  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 is 
decreasing in 𝑁′, implying that pumps with a high number of participants are more attractive to 
overconfident players. This effect arises because a greater number of participants leads to a 
higher peak price and more dispersion in exit prices, so only a small bias in the perceived 
likelihood of exiting the pump near the peak is required to make a pump attractive to an 
overconfident individual.  
 
< Figure 5 here > 
 
Next, we consider whether gambling preferences can explain why individuals participate 
in pump-and-dumps. Previous literature shows that individuals have a preference for “lottery-
like” assets with positively skewed payoffs (Barberis and Huang, 2008; Kumar, 2009). In our 
framework, a single pump does not have a positively skewed payoff distribution; the gains and 
losses are approximately symmetrical. Similarly, a single bet on red or black at the roulette table 
does not have a right-skewed payoff. To explain the attraction of non-skewed games such a 
red/black bets in roulette, Barberis (2012) shows that gamblers view these games not in isolation, 
but as a series of bets that collectively constitute a game. When a gambler intends to play a game 
repeatedly and stop if their losses exceed a “walk away” threshold, a game that has symmetric 
payoffs as a one-off gamble becomes right-skewed for a series of bets. Other studies also suggest 
that gamblers favor repeated games over single games (Dickerson, 1984; Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2009).  
Applying the mechanism proposed by Barberis (2012) to our setting, suppose a gambler 
starts with $𝑎 (𝑎 > 0) and considers whether to participate in a series of pumps until they either 
deplete their wealth to $𝑏 (𝑏 < 𝑎) incurring a loss of 𝑎 − 𝑏 or accumulate a wealth of $𝑐 (𝑐 > 𝑎) 




?̃?𝑞~ ((𝑐 − 𝑎), ℙ(𝑐 − 𝑎); −(𝑎 − 𝑏), ℙ(−(𝑎 − 𝑏)))          (6) 
where ℙ(𝑐 − 𝑎) represents the probability of achieving a (𝑐 − 𝑎) gain and ℙ(−(𝑎 − 𝑏)) 
represents the probability of suffering a loss of (𝑎 − 𝑏). We can estimate these probabilities by 
approximating the gambler’s wealth as a Brownian motion starting at $𝑎 and terminating upon 
reaching one of two absorbing barriers on either side of the starting point, $𝑏 and $𝑐.14 Based on 
Dixit (1993), the estimates for ℙ(𝑐 − 𝑎) and ℙ(−(𝑎 − 𝑏)) are  









                and             ℙ(−(𝑎 − 𝑏)) = 1 − ℙ(𝑐 − 𝑎)        (7) 
where 𝜇 and 𝜎2 are the mean and variance of the payoffs from a single pump: 𝜇 =
−𝛽
2




(𝑀2 + 2𝑀(𝑁′ − 1) + 2(𝑁′ − 1)2).  
Following Barberis (2012), a gambler chooses a strategy 𝑞 (a strategy consists of the 
values 𝑏 and 𝑐 that determine when the gambler stops playing) from a set of strategies 𝑄 to solve 
the maximization problem,  
max𝑞∈𝑄 𝑉(?̃?𝑞)           (8) 
where 𝑉(∙) is the expected value of the gamble based on the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) 
developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In essence, the gambler determines the optimal 𝑏 
and 𝑐 that lead to the highest expected payoff. According to CPT, individuals overweight small 
probability outcomes and underweight large probability outcomes. Additionally, individuals 
valuation of payoffs is concave in the region of gains and convex in the region of losses. These 
features of the CPT explain why individuals are attracted towards positively skewed payoffs and 
serves as the basis for various theories of gambling (Barberis and Huang, 2008; Barberis, 2012).  
We solve the gambler’s optimization problem numerically, determining the optimal 𝑏 and 
𝑐 for a given set of parameter values.15 We find the optimal 𝑏 is $0 and the optimal 𝑐 is $245. 
This implies that a gambler starting off with 𝑎 = $6 participates in pumps either until they go 
bankrupt or until they have accumulated a wealth of $245. This strategy yields a positive 
                                                          
14
 Given that the payoff from a single pump follows a trapezoid distribution rather than a normal distribution, the 
Brownian motion approximation assumes a sufficiently large number of small bets. 
15
 We set 𝑃0 = $5, 𝛽 = 0.01, 𝑀 = 10, 𝑁′ = 1,000, 𝑎 = $6. We set the CPT parameters as the benchmark estimates 
in Barberis (2012), 𝛼 = 0.95, 𝛿 = 0.5, and 𝜆 = 1.5. The full set of equations for the value function and probability 
weighting function are in Section IA1 of the Internet Appendix.  
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expected value for the gambler with CPT preferences and therefore provides a second possible 
reason for why individuals participate in cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps. 
 
Result 3: Individuals with cumulative prospect theory preferences participate in cryptocurrency 
pump-and-dumps as a form of gambling. 
 
In Figure 6 we illustrate how the attractiveness of cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps as a 
form of gambling varies with different parameters. We vary the parameters one at a time, 
plotting the gambler’s expected value of participating in the series of pumps, 𝑉(?̃?𝑞). The figure 
shows that gamblers are more attracted to cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps (higher expected 
value) when the pumped coins are relatively illiquid (high 𝛽), there are relatively few 
manipulators (low 𝑀), and there are many participants (high 𝑁′). These relations are similar to 
those of overconfident individuals.  
 
< Figure 6 here > 
 
3.4 Pump characteristics 
Having established two possible reasons for why individuals participate in 
cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps—overconfidence and gambling—we now summarize some 
other empirically testable predictions from the framework. A basic but important prediction that 




(𝑁′ − 2𝑀)) is that, ceteris paribus, pumps have higher peak prices, larger 
pre-pump-to-peak returns, and higher profits for the manipulator when there are more 
participants (high 𝑁′) or the coin is less liquid (high 𝛽).  
 
Result 4: Pumps with more participants and pumps in less liquid coins have higher peak prices 
and earn manipulators higher profits. 
 
From the illustrations in Figures 5 and 6, we know that more pre-pump trading by 
manipulators (𝑀) makes pumps relatively less attractive to individuals of all kinds—rational 
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agents would expect larger expected losses to manipulators, higher levels of overconfidence are 
needed to induce participation when 𝑀 is higher, and the expected value of participating in a 
series of pumps decreases in 𝑀.  
 
Result 5: Pumps with more manipulator participation are less attractive to non-manipulators 
and therefore have less non-manipulator participation. 
  
Figures 5 and 6 also show that overconfident individuals and individuals that consider 
pumps as a form of gambling are more likely to participate in pumps of relatively illiquid coins, 
for which there are more extreme returns and greater dispersion in payoffs. However, coins do 
require at least some minimum level of liquidity to be feasible otherwise manipulators cannot 
even establish their initial position in the coin.  
 
Result 6: Non-manipulators are more attracted to pumps in relatively illiquid coins. 
 
Interestingly, Results 4 to 6 imply considerations on the strategy of manipulators. 
Manipulators face a trade-off in determining the size of the position to take initially: they would 
naturally want to take a large position to earn large dollar profits, but cannot take too large a 
position otherwise there would be few or no non-manipulator participants and the pump would 
fail. Similarly, when it comes to the choice of coin, a manipulator would want to select relatively 
illiquid coins to make the pumps attractive to non-manipulators and generate high peak prices, 
but highly illiquid coins are probably not feasible to pump. 
 
3.5 Repeated games 
 Next, we examine the dynamics of repeated pump-and-dump games, which is crucial to 
understand how cryptocurrency pumps-and-dumps evolve through time. Participation in pumps 
is determined by various factors that can change through time. Let 𝑁𝑡
𝑂𝐶, 𝑁𝑡
𝐺𝑃, and 𝑁𝑡
′ denote the 
number of sufficiently overconfident individuals (OC), the number of participants with gambling 
preferences (GP), and the total number of participants (𝑁𝑡
′ = 𝑁𝑡
𝑂𝐶 + 𝑁𝑡
𝐺𝑃) in the 𝑡𝑡ℎ iteration of 
the game (we also refer to these iterations as rounds). Now consider how these numbers can 
change through time. 
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As overconfident individuals observe the actual prices at which they buy and sell pumped 
coins and the profits or losses that they incur, we expect them to revise their beliefs about their 
skill and therefore about their expected profits. Effectively, some of their overconfidence bias 
should attenuate through time as they learn about their skill and payoffs, consistent with other 
models of overconfidence (Gervais and Odean, 2001). In this process, as their overconfidence 
bias attenuates (as 𝑖 → 0), some overconfident individuals will cross the threshold  
𝑚𝑖𝑛and 
switch from participating in pumps to not participating. Let 𝜌𝑡
𝑂𝐶 denote the number of 
overconfident individuals that switch to not participating after round 𝑡. Additionally, let 𝜆𝑂𝐶 be 
the Poisson arrival rate of new, sufficiently overconfident individuals that participate in pumps.  
Similarly, individuals with gambling preferences stop participating in pumps if they 
achieve their desired gains of $(𝑐 − 𝑎) or lose $(𝑎 − 𝑏). Let 𝜌𝑡
𝐺𝑃 denote the number of 
gambling-motivated participants that cease to participate in pumps after round 𝑡. Also, let 𝜆𝐺𝑃 be 
the Poisson arrival rate of new participants with gambling preferences. Given these new 




′ ] = (𝜆𝑂𝐶 + 𝜆𝐺𝑃) − (𝜌𝑡−1
𝑂𝐶 + 𝜌𝑡−1
𝐺𝑃 ).         (9) 
Equation (9) simply states that the change in the number of pump participants depends on the 
rate at which new overconfident individuals and individuals looking for a gamble arrive at the 
market and the rate at which existing overconfident individuals and gamblers cease to participate 
in pumps due to learning about their ability or hitting their maximum gains or losses. 
Importantly, as stated in Result 4, the number of participants determines the peak prices in 
pump-and-dumps as well as the manipulator profits.  
The empirical implication of equation (9) is that we expect to see increases in the 
volumes traded in pump-and-dumps, increases in pump-and-dump peak returns, and increases in 
manipulator profits through time when the participant inflow rate (𝜆𝑂𝐶 + 𝜆𝐺𝑃) exceeds the 
outflow rate (𝜌𝑡
𝑂𝐶 + 𝜌𝑡
𝐺𝑃). This scenario can be expected when: (i) there is increasing interest in 
cryptocurrencies in general, (ii) overconfidence increases, for example, due to self-attribution of 
success in past pumps, and (iii) there is a market-wide increase in the propensity to gamble, with 




Result 7: Participation in pump-and-dumps through time increases when the general level of 
interest in cryptocurrencies increases, when the returns of past pumps are higher, and when 
there is an increase in market-wide gambling activity. 
 
A further implication of equation (9) is that among pump participants, the mix of 
overconfident individuals and gamblers will vary through time. For example, all else equal, an 
increase in past returns on pumps is expected to increase the proportion of overconfident 
individuals among pump participants. Similarly, an increase in the market-wide propensity to 
gamble, all else equal, is expected to increase the proportion of gamblers. 
 
4. Empirical tests 
4.1 Data  
We identify cases of pump-and-dump manipulation in cryptocurrency exchanges using 
chat history data from Telegram pump-and-dump channels. We hand-collect pump data for the 
cryptocurrency exchange Binance and add to it pump data for the cryptocurrency exchange 
Yobit from the database compiled by PumpAnalysis (PA).
16
 In our sample, we only include 
cases in which the Telegram pump-and-dump administrator pre-specifies a date, time, and 
exchange for a pump and releases a “pump signal” containing the name of the pumped coin. Our 
sample therefore only includes events in which the pump group administrator is explicit to its 
members that the intention is to pump the given coin. For each pump, we record the coin being 
pumped, the exchange, and the time the pump signal is sent. We also extract ancillary 
information such as the number of pumps a group has conducted prior to the pump, the number 
of groups participating in the pump, and the total number of members in the pump group(s) 
participating in the pump.  
We couple the information on pumps with data on all trades on the Binance and Yobit 
exchanges (sourced from the official Binance API and data provider Kaiko, respectively). After 
reconciling the information on pumps with the trades data and restricting our focus to Binance 
                                                          
16
 Although the website hosting the dataset (PumpAnalysis.com) is no longer active, we downloaded a copy of the 
data before it went offline. We conducted a data audit to verify the quality of dataset and did not find any material 
inaccuracies. In this audit, we verified the pump-related information in the database against the actual information 
found in the chat history of the pump-and-dump group for a random sample of pumps. Our copy of the PA dataset is 
available upon request. 
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and Yobit due to the availability of reliable trade data, our sample consists of 355 pumps (64 on 
Binance and 291 on Yobit). The earliest pump in our sample occurs on December 29, 2017, 
while the last pump is on June 22, 2018. Based on the number of pump group members, up to 
23.3 million total participants are involved in the pump-and-dumps during our sample period.  
We obtain daily market capitalization and price data for all cryptocurrencies from 
coinmarketcap.com, a cryptocurrency data aggregation website, and daily exchange-level price 
and volume data for all cryptocurrencies from cryptocompare.com, another cryptocurrency data 
aggregation website. We also obtain Google Search Volume Index data from the Google Trends 
website. Lastly, we obtain daily Bitcoin gambling volumes from WalletExplorer.com, a Bitcoin 
blockchain explorer website. 
 
4.2 Pump-and-dump prevalence and characteristics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the trading activity on the two exchanges (Yobit 
and Binance) and the prevalence of pump-and-dump manipulation. In our seven-month sample, 
there are 1,307 cryptocurrencies (“coins”) traded on the two exchanges with a combined volume 
of around $20 billion. The 355 instances of pump-and-dump manipulation that we identify and 
for which we have all the necessary data occur in 197 distinct coins. Therefore, around 15% of 
all coins (197/1,307) experience at least one pump-and-dump manipulation during the seven-
month period with an average of 1.80 pumps per coin and 2.67 pumps per pump-day.
17
 These 
manipulation rates (being a lower bound as they include only instances on which we have the 
necessary data) suggest that cryptocurrency pump-and-dump manipulation is widespread and 
frequent.  
The volumes traded during pump-and-dump episodes are economically meaningful, with 
around $350 million traded during the 355 pumps in our sample. We estimate that manipulators 
buy around $24.38 million of coins in the two hours leading up to the pumps, resulting in a 
conservatively estimated aggregate profit to manipulators of around $6.04 million.
18
 This figure 
                                                          
17
 A “pump-day” is a day in which there is at least one instance of pump-and-dump manipulation. 
18
 Manipulator profits are estimated from the difference in the volume-weighted average price during the two hours 
preceding the pump signal and the volume-weighted average price during the pump (from start to peak). Factoring 
in transaction costs slightly reduces these profit estimates. For example, assuming that manipulators pay the highest 
trading fees on both exchanges (0.1% of transaction value on Binance and 0.2% on Yobit; the actual fees could be 
lower, depend on factors such as trading volume), the profit estimate decreases only marginally to $5.98 million. If 
we further assume that manipulators pay an effective spread of 1% on their trades (which is 18 times larger than the 
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reflects the estimated wealth transfer from pump participants (pump group followers) to 
manipulators (pump group administrators) during our sample. As a return, manipulators earn 
around 24.77% in the space of minutes or hours.  
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
Table 2 reports the characteristics of pump-and-dump manipulations. On average, pumps 
take around eight minutes to reach their peak price from the time the pump signal is sent (median 
time of 1.54 minutes) and generate an average return of 65.47% in that short space of time. For 
comparison, the highest daily return earned by Bitcoin during our sample period is 22.72%, and 
that for the S&P 500 index is 2.72%. The return earned by the average pump in eight minutes is 
around three (24) times higher than the highest return earned by Bitcoin (S&P 500) in an entire 
day. The average pump return is also around four standard deviations higher than the pumped 
coin’s average daily return. This result suggests that pumps have a substantial effect on the prices 
of pumped coins, even after considering the high volatility of cryptocurrencies.  
The impact of pumps is also evident in volume. The traded volume of pumped coins 
during manipulation days is, on average, around 13.5 times the average daily volume for the 
pumped coin. Since pumps account for around 40% of the total pump-day volume, the trading 
volume generated by the average pump in eight minutes from start to peak is around five times 
the average daily trading volume for the pumped coin.  
Finally, manipulators earn around 49% on an average pump. Here we calculate the 
percentage profit in each pump and take the average across pumps, whereas the profit number in 
Table 1 was a percentage calculated from the aggregate earnings and aggregate manipulator 
position. This profit figure corroborates our previous observation that cryptocurrency pumps 
provide manipulators with high returns in a short period of time.  
 
< Table 2 here > 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
average effective spread for Bitcoin trades on Gdax, see Dyhrberg, Foley, and Svec (2018)), the profit estimate 
decreases to $5.44 million. 
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Next we examine price and volume dynamics around pumps. In the theoretical 
framework (as illustrated in Figure 3), prices rise before the release of a pump signal as 
manipulators build their positions. Prices rise sharply once a pump signal is released as non-
manipulators join the pump. Finally, prices reach a turning point, after which they fall back to 
pre-pump levels.  
Figure 7 Panel A provides the empirical analogue of these predicted price dynamics, 
showing the cumulative returns from 15 minutes before to 45 minutes after a pump signal is 
released. Prices rise around 10% in the 15 minutes preceding the pump signal, most likely due to 
the price impact of manipulators building their initial positions (𝑀𝛽 in the theoretical 
framework). Prices rapidly rise a further 40% following the release of the pump signal due to the 
price impact of non-manipulators joining the pump (𝑁′𝛽 in the theoretical framework).19 After 
reaching the peak, prices fall at a slower rate until they reach approximately the initial (pre-
pump) level (𝑃0 in the theoretical framework). The price trajectory in Figure 7 is very similar to 
that in the theoretical framework.  
Panel B in Figure 7 plots the cumulative volume during the same one-hour window 
around the pump signal, expressing the cumulative volume as a percentage of the total volume in 
that one-hour window. Approximately 15% of the total trading volume during the pump occurs 
in the 15 minutes leading up to the release of the pump signal. This pre-pump trading activity is 
likely a result of manipulators building their initial positions in the pumped coin (𝑀 in the 
theoretical framework). The highest trading rate occurs immediately following the release of the 
pump signal as non-manipulators race to buy the coin being pumped. The rate of trading during 
the phase in which the price returns to its pre-pump level is more subdued.  
 
< Figure 7 here > 
 
4.3 Determinants of pump participation 
Results 1 to 3 in the theoretical framework predict that while rational individuals would 
not participate in pumps, overconfident individuals and individuals seeking to gamble would 
                                                          
19
 The peak in Figure 7 (at around 40%) is lower than the average peak return (around 65% in Table 2) because in 
Figure 7, the individual pumps are aligned based on the pump signal (𝑡 = 0) but are not aligned in their peaks. Some 
pumps peak earlier than others, which is why Figure 7 does not reflect the average of the peak returns. 
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potentially be attracted to cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps as games in which they perceive 
positive expected value. We now test these predictions. Overconfidence and gambling 
preferences are individual characteristics and are best measured at an individual level. However, 
our data do not allow us to identify individuals and measure their individual characteristics. 
Instead, we use a proxy for overconfidence measured at the pump level and an aggregate market-
wide proxy for gambling activity.  
Our main proxy for overconfidence exploits the past success or failure of the pump 
group: it is the average start-to-peak return earned in the two most recent pumps conducted by 
the Telegram pump groups orchestrating pump 𝑗 of coin 𝑖 on day 𝑡 (𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡).
20
 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) find that trading volumes in stock markets are positively 
correlated with previous returns and attribute this effect to positive returns inducing investor 
overconfidence. Due to self-attribution bias, investors have a tendency to attribute positive 
outcomes (e.g., earning high returns) to their own skill, thereby fueling overconfidence in their 
abilities. Given this logic, members of pump groups that have had recent success in conducting 
pumps with high returns are more likely to be more overconfident about their prospects in 
subsequent pumps than others. Our hypothesis that overconfidence contributes to pump 
participation implies that we should expect to see higher participation in pumps that are 
conducted by groups likely to have more overconfident members. Our results are robust to using 
an alternative, less granular proxy for overconfidence, being the past five-day cryptocurrency 
market returns. 
Our main proxy for gambling among individuals that are part of the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem is the revenue of known gambling services that accept gambles in Bitcoin. For 
example, SatoshiDICE is a relatively well-known cryptocurrency gambling site in which 
participants wager an amount of Bitcoin and receive a payoff determined by a random number 
generator. If individuals with gambling preferences use pump-and-dumps as yet another venue 
for gambling, pump participation rates are likely to be positively correlated with the general 
demand for gambling within cryptocurrencies. Thus, our proxy for gambling activity 
(𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡) is the daily log revenue of known Bitcoin gambling services identified in the 
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 The results are robust to the use of three most recent pumps instead of two.  
29 
 
Wallet Explorer (WE) database.
21
 We remove the effects of general cryptocurrency market 
activity from this gambling measure by regressing it on the contemporaneous value and three 
lagged values of the average daily return and trading volume for all cryptocurrencies and using 
the residuals from this regression. 
For each of the 355 pump-and-dump manipulations in our sample, we measure the log 
total trading volume during pump 𝑗 in coin 𝑖 on day 𝑡 from the release of the pump signal to 
three hours after the pump’s peak price is reached. We regress this participation measure 
(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) on the 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 proxies. We control for lagged 
volatility, which captures differences in uncertainty about the coin value. We also control for the 
number of Telegram groups participating in the pump as a proxy for the number of manipulators, 
because we expect that individuals are less likely to participate in pumps the more manipulators 
participate. Finally, we also control for the number of members in Telegram groups participating 
in the pumps, the liquidity of the coin (log average daily trading volume), and differences across 
the two exchanges by including exchange fixed effects (a 𝑌𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖 indicator variable). While 
testing the overconfidence channel in Model 1, we also include week fixed effects to absorb 
other time-series factors. 
The results in Table 3 Models 1 and 2 show that both overconfidence and gambling have 
statistically significant positive associations with the level of participation in pumps. The 
positive associations are consistent with the notion that both overconfidence and gambling 
contribute to participation in pump-and-dump manipulations, in line with the mechanisms 
illustrated in the theoretical framework (Results 2 and 3). The coefficient for 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is statistically significant at the 1% level while the coefficient for 
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 is statistically significant at the 5% level. The regressions in Table 3 (Model 3) also 
show evidence that pump participation is negatively related to the number of manipulators, 
consistent with the theory (Result 5). More manipulators imply greater aggregate losses for non-
manipulators, thereby discouraging participation. Model 4 shows that uncertainty about the 
fundamental value of a coin (lagged volatility) does not explain pump participation, further 
                                                          
21
 WE identifies the Bitcoin wallets of many different entities and reports all blockchain transactions associated with 
those wallets. The use of actual transactions recorded on the blockchain enhances reliability since self-reported data 




supporting the notion that cryptocurrency pumps are not a form of information-based 
manipulation. 
Model 5 includes all regressors. Both overconfidence and gambling retain their positive 
signs and statistical significance. We use the overconfidence and gambling coefficients from this 
regression to compare the economic impact of these two mechanisms on pump participation. 
When overconfidence increases from its 25
th
 percentile to its 75
th
 percentile (an increase in prior 
pump returns by 87%), pump participation increases by 37.97%. Similarly, when gambling 
increases from its 25
th
 percentile to its 75
th
 percentile (an increase in daily Bitcoin gambling 
volume of $45,321), pump participation increases by 24.33%.  
As an alternative way to interpret the magnitudes, when the overconfidence proxy 
increases by 10% from its mean of 69.16%, pump participation increases by 2.62%. Similarly, 
when Bitcoin gambling volume increases by 10% from its mean of $97,528.81, pump 
participation increases by 3.39%. The magnitudes of both mechanisms appear to be 
economically meaningful and are robust to controlling for other drivers. We therefore conclude 
that both overconfidence and gambling are reasons why people participate in pumps.  
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
We also consider an alternative proxy for overconfidence motivated by the literature on 
self-attribution bias: the past five-day cryptocurrency market returns. We do not rely on this 
measure in our main tests as it is less granular than our main proxy and it could capture other 
confounding effects such as the general level of interest or sentiment towards cryptocurrencies. 
Nevertheless, the time-series relation between this alternative overconfidence proxy and the level 
of pump activity is consistent with the overconfidence mechanism.  
Figure 8 plots daily Bitcoin prices alongside the time series of the number of pumps per 
day (Panel A) and the average pump returns (Panel B). Both the number of pumps per day and 
pump returns follow similar patterns as the lagged Bitcoin price. This trend is consistent with the 
notion that overconfidence leads to higher participation in pumps and higher pump returns. 
Similarly, Figure 8 Panel C shows that the time series of our main proxy for participant 
overconfidence (𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡) has a positive relation with daily pump participation 




< Figure 8 here > 
 
We also implement a more direct test of the time-series drivers of participation in pumps. 
Recall that Result 7 predicts pump participation increases through time when there is an increase 
in the general level of interest in cryptocurrencies, higher past returns on pumps, and increasing 
market-wide gambling activity. To test these predictions, we estimate time-series regressions in 
which the dependent variable is daily pump participation (calculated as the daily average of the 
pump participation measure, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) and the independent variables are daily averages 
of the overconfidence and gambling proxies used in our previous tests. We also add a time-series 
proxy for the level of interest in cryptocurrencies, being the log of the average Google Search 
Volume Index for cryptocurrency related search terms on day 𝑡 (𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡).
22
  
The results support the three predicted drivers of the pump participation dynamics.
23
 All 
three factors are individually positive and significant drivers of the time-series variation in 
cryptocurrency pump participation. The results show that much of the time-series variation in 
cryptocurrency pumps can be attributed to variation in overconfidence, gambling, and general 
interest in cryptocurrencies. 
 
4.4 Determinants of pump outcomes 
Our theoretical framework predicts that a number of factors such as the coin liquidity and 
the level of participation determine pump-and-dump outcomes such as manipulator profits and 
pump returns. We now test these predictions by regressing measures of outcomes on 
determinants at the individual pump level. Table 4 reports the results.  
First, we test the determinants of manipulator profits, approximated by the difference 
between the volume-weighted average price in the two hours preceding a pump signal and the 
volume-weighted average price during the pump (from start to peak) multiplied by the trading 
volume in the two hours leading up to the pump. The theory (Result 4) predicts that manipulator 
profits are higher when more non-manipulators participate in the pump (higher 𝑁’) and for 
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 The search terms we include are “altcoin”, “Bitcoin”, “crypto”, “cryptocurrency”, and “ICO”.  
23
 Given these tests are similar to those reported in Table 3, but with less statistical power and generally similar 
conclusions, we report the results in the Internet Appendix (Table IA4). 
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pumps in less liquid coins (higher 𝛽). We find that former prediction is supported by the results 
in Table 4, which show a positive relation between manipulator profits and the level of pump 
participation. The estimates suggest that a 1% increase in pump participation is associated with a 
0.96% increase in the manipulators’ profit. Recall that manipulator profits come at the expense 
of non-manipulator pump participants. Intuitively, with more participants, manipulators are able 
to extract greater payoffs from pumps. The results are robust to using an alternative measure of 
pump participation: the log number of members in all Telegram groups participating in the pump 
(Table IA2 in the Internet Appendix). We find weak evidence, at best, in support of the second 
prediction regarding manipulators earning more profits for pumps in less liquid coins. Although 
our liquidity measure has the predicted direction (negative), it is not statistically significant.  
Manipulators face a tradeoff in determining their optimal level of pre-pump trading: they 
want to trade a large volume to make a large dollar profit, but the more they trade, the lower the 
participation of non-manipulators. In the second regression in Table 4, we find that manipulators 
tend to take larger positions before releasing the pump signal when they anticipate a higher rate 
of participation by non-manipulators and when the coin is more liquid such that they are able to 
establish a larger position for a given level of price impact. The estimates suggest that a 1% 
increase in pump participation is associated with a 0.44% increase in the manipulators’ pre-pump 
inventory position and a 1% increase in liquidity increases the size of pre-pump positions by 
0.46%.  
The theory (Result 4) predicts that pumps have higher peak prices, and thus higher pre-
pump-to-peak returns, when there is more participation in the pump (higher 𝑁’) and less liquidity 
(higher 𝛽). Both of these predictions are supported by the third regression in Table 4, which 
shows a positive (/negative) relation between pre-pump-to-peak returns and the level of pump 
participation (/liquidity). The estimates suggest that a 1% increase in pump participation is 
associated with a 0.24% higher pump return.  
Finally, we expect that through time pumps will become faster (the time from pump 
signal to the pump peak will decrease) as slow individuals learn that they are at a disadvantage 
and cease to participate in pumps. The attrition of relatively slow individuals leaves a higher 
concentration of relatively fast individuals, thereby reducing the duration of pumps. We find 
support for this conjecture in the fourth regression of Table 4. The duration of pumps is 
negatively related to our proxy for participant experience, which is the log number of pumps 
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conducted in the past by the Telegram groups participating in the present pump. The estimates 
suggest that a 1% increase in participant experience reduces pump duration by 0.33%. This 
magnitude implies that pumps conducted by groups that have conducted three pumps previously 
are, on average, 16.50% faster than pumps conducted by groups that have only conducted two 
pumps previously.  
 
< Table 4 here > 
 
4.5 Which coins are more likely to be pumped? 
The characteristics of coins more likely to be targeted by a pump-and-dump groups will 
be driven by what coins are most attractive to manipulators given that manipulators choose 
which coins to pump. The theoretical framework suggests that, all else equal, a manipulator’s 
profits increase with the illiquidity of the coin (𝛽) as larger price impacts lead to higher returns, 
and the number of pump participants (𝑁′). The manipulator’s profits do not depend on the type 
of participant or their motivation (e.g., overconfident individuals vs. gamblers), but simply on the 
aggregate number of participants that the manipulator is able to attract. Therefore, we can expect 
that manipulators will target relatively illiquid coins and coins that are attractive to a large 
number of non-manipulators.  
Considering the preferences of non-manipulators, both overconfident individuals and 
gamblers are likely to prefer coins that are less liquid and have larger price impacts (see Result 
6). Therefore, we expect that liquidity, whether measured directly or proxied by coin market 
capitalization, will be the primary driver of which coins are more likely to be manipulated.  
To test these predictions, we estimate logistic regressions of the probability that a coin is 
subject to at least one pump-and-dump during our sample period. The results in Table 5 indicate 
that pumps are more likely in smaller coins (coins with lower market capitalization). This result 
is highly statistically significant and the magnitude suggests that as market capitalization is 
doubled, the odds of being pumped reduce by 14.79%.
24
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 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖  has a coefficient of -0.16. This coefficient implies an odds ratio of 0.8521 (𝑒
−0.16 = 0.8521). This 
odds ratio means that if 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖  increases by one unit, then the odds of the coin being pumped reduce by 
14.79%. Since 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖  is the log to the base two of market capitalization, it increases by one unit when market 
capitalization is doubled. 
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While the theory predicts that both manipulators and non-manipulators have a preference 
for illiquid coins, for a pump to be feasible, there must be at least some minimum level of 
liquidity, otherwise it is not even possible for manipulators to establish a sufficient initial 
position to warrant pumping the coin. To allow for this potential non-linearity, as regressors we 
include dummy variables for the coin’s liquidity quartile (quartiles of average daily number of 
trades and average daily dollar trading volume). We find that indeed the likelihood of a coin 
being pumped is not monotonically related to liquidity. The second lowest liquidity quartile is 
most likely to be targeted by manipulators, followed by the third lowest quartile. The highly 
liquid coins and highly illiquid coins are less likely to be manipulated. The coefficients of 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑄2𝑖 and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑄3𝑖 indicate that coins in the second and third quartile by number of 
trades have 263.28% and 118.15% higher odds of being pumped than coins in the fourth 
(highest) quartile, while the lowest quartile coins have 42.31% lower odds of being pumped than 
the highest quartile coins.  
The finding that coins in the middle of the liquidity spectrum are most likely to be 
manipulated mirrors results from stock markets, where the ideal target for a manipulator is a 
stock that is sufficiently illiquid to be successfully manipulated, but sufficiently large and liquid 
for the manipulation to be worthwhile (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2014). The results in Table 
5 are robust to using an alternative measure of the likelihood that a coin is targeted by 
manipulators: the number of pumps conducted in the coin (Table IA3). 
 
< Table 5 here > 
 
4.6 Impact of pump-and-dumps on market characteristics 
Finally, we analyze how pumps affect market characteristics, both on the market that is 
pumped and on other markets that trade the pumped coin.
25
 We measure trading volumes, 
returns, and volatility each coin-day (for coins that are pumped at least once during the sample 
period) for the pumped market and the other markets that trade the pumped coin. We then 
regress these trading characteristics on an indicator for whether the coin was the target of a 
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 As illustrated in Section 2, pump group administrators typically specify not only a coin but also a cryptocurrency 
exchange on which the pump will occur, which we refer to as the “pumped market”. Other exchanges that also trade 
the same coin may be impacted differently and therefore we analyze them separately. 
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pump-and-dump manipulation that day (𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡). We control for the coin’s market 
capitalization, market fixed effects (a dummy variable for the Yobit exchange), coin fixed 
effects, and time fixed effects.  
The results in Table 6 Panel A show the effects of pumps on the pumped market. Traded 
volume is significantly increased during pumps on the pumped exchange, even after controlling 
for the various other coin and time effects. The coefficient for 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The coefficient suggests that trading volume is 
about 30 to 70 times higher when a coin is pumped.
26
  
Interestingly, the coin’s return measured from before the pump (day 𝑡 − 1) to after the 
pump (day 𝑡 + 2, with day 𝑡 being the day of the pump) is not significantly affected by the pump 
despite the earlier results showing that at intraday horizons pumps generate large returns in the 
order of 65%. These regression results therefore confirm that, consistent with the theory, the 
prices of pumped coins return back to their pre-pump levels following the conclusion of a pump, 
with no permanent effects on the valuations of the coins. 
Lastly, the results show that volatility, measured from the high/low price range for the 
coin on day 𝑡, is considerably higher on the pumped market when a pump and dump occurs. The 
coefficient for 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is statistically significant in all specifications and indicates that 
intraday volatility is between six and eight times higher when a pump occurs than it is at other 
times, controlling for other factors.
27
  
Although the impact of pumps on volatility is very large conditional on a pump 
occurring, pumps are not the major driver of the extremely high levels of volatility in 
cryptocurrencies overall.  In our sample, the pumps that we have been able to identify occur on 
less than 5% of the coin-days. Given the cases that we identify provide a lower bound on the 
prevalence of pump-and-dump manipulation in cryptocurrencies, assume for illustration that 
pumps occur approximately 5% of the time. If cryptocurrency volatility in the absence of pumps 
is 𝜎 and pumps increase that volatility to 7𝜎 conditional on a pump occurring (as estimated in 
the regressions) then the overall, unconditional, effect of pumps is to increase volatility by 30% 
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 With the natural log of trading volume as the dependent variable, the estimated effect of a pump is to increase 
volume by 𝑒3.38 = 29.4  to 𝑒4.27 = 71.5 times its usual level. 
27
 With the natural log of high-low range-based volatility as the dependent variable, the estimated effect of a pump is 
to increase volatility by 𝑒1.86 = 6.4  to 𝑒2.04 = 7.7 times its usual level, all else equal. 
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of its natural level.
28
 While a 30% increase is a meaningful contribution to overall volatility, it is 
only a small fraction of the “excess” volatility in cryptocurrencies compared to other asset 
classes. For example, Liu and Tsyvinski (2020) show that Bitcoin returns are five to ten times 
more volatile than stocks, depending on the return frequency. 
 
< Table 6 here > 
 
Table 6 Panel B tests for spillover effects onto other markets that trade the pumped coin 
but that were not directly targeted by the pump group administrators. The results show that 
trading volume for the pumped coin tends to increase on other exchanges that trade the coin 
during a pump. The coefficient for 𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is positive in all specifications and statistically 
significant in Model 2 when we include coin fixed effects. Volatility of pumped coins is also 
significantly elevated on other exchanges during pump and dumps, however not as much as the 
increase in volatility on the pumped market. These results are consistent with arbitrageurs 
somewhat, but not fully, aligning the prices of coins across markets so that some of the price 
distortion of a manipulated coin on a manipulated market is reflected in the prices of that coin on 
other markets.  
 
5. Welfare implications 
Cryptocurrency pump-and-dump schemes affect welfare in three main ways.  
First, pumps cause wealth transfers. In aggregate, wealth is transferred from the least 
sophisticated players (e.g., slow players, gamblers, and overconfident players) to manipulators 
and the more sophisticated players (e.g., fast players). The losses incurred by gamblers do not 
necessarily decrease their welfare because gamblers receive utility from the act of gambling 
itself (Conlisk, 1993). Their losses are gains for manipulators and sophisticated players and 
therefore the wealth transfers from gamblers may increase aggregate welfare by the amount of 
utility obtained from gambling. There is, however, scope for harm to the gamblers given the lack 
of regulatory oversight. In other settings, gambling tends to be regulated to reduce the risk that 
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 Given these assumptions and estimates, volatility in presence of pumps is 0.95𝜎 + 0.05(7𝜎) = 1.30𝜎, i.e., 1.30 
times its natural level, 𝜎. 
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gamblers are excessively exploited by gambling service providers. No such controls exist in 
cryptocurrency pump-and-dump games.  
In contrast, the transfers from slow and overconfident players to manipulators and more 
sophisticated payers are likely to decrease aggregate welfare if the less sophisticated players tend 
to be less wealthy and therefore have a higher marginal utility of wealth than the more 
sophisticated players. In other financial markets, transfers from less sophisticated to more 
sophisticated participants are accompanied by an offsetting social benefit, being information 
production and the provision of price discovery by sophisticated investors. No such offsetting 
benefit is present in cryptocurrency pump-and-dump manipulations. 
Second, cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps, like other forms of market manipulation, 
cause price distortions that harm price accuracy and informativeness. The price distortions could 
in theory harm the efficiency of resource allocation. However, because the price distortions from 
pumps are short-lived and tend to disappear within two days of the pump, it is difficult to 
imagine cryptocurrency pump-and-dump schemes have any material effects on resource 
allocation. 
Third, widespread manipulation damages the integrity of cryptocurrency markets and 
investor confidence with respect to tokens and tokenization. Financial institutions that are 
concerned about their reputation might choose not to associate themselves with cryptocurrency 
markets or tokenization more broadly. Additionally, regulators cite manipulation as a reason to 
restrict the expansion of cryptocurrency markets, tokenization, and cryptocurrency-linked 
products. For example, the US Securities and Exchange Commission has rejected applications 
for Bitcoin Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) multiple times due to concerns about market 
manipulation in the Bitcoin market. Lack of confidence/trust in cryptocurrency markets can 
impede the development and adoption of cryptocurrencies and tokenization of financial 
securities. These effects potentially have large negative welfare consequences.  
While it is virtually impossible to quantify these welfare consequences, it seems likely 
the effects of stunted adoption of these new technologies could be an order of magnitude larger 
than the welfare implications of the wealth transfers from participating in cryptocurrency pump-
and-dump schemes. Therefore, widespread manipulation in cryptocurrency markets matters for 





We show that cryptocurrencies have given rise to a new form of pump-and-dump 
manipulation. This manipulation is similar in some respects to traditional pump-and-dump 
manipulation of stocks, but it is completely different in other respects. 
Like pump-and-dump manipulation of stocks, cryptocurrency pumps generate large price 
distortions (average price movements around 65%), generate abnormal trading volumes (13.5 
times average volume), and earn manipulators millions of dollars. Similar to manipulation of 
stocks, manipulators target fairly illiquid coins, although they avoid coins with so little liquidity 
that manipulation would be infeasible or not sufficiently profitable. Although targeted coins 
experience extreme returns while being manipulated, their prices subsequently revert to their pre-
manipulation levels with no apparent long-lasting effects on their valuations. 
However, in contrast to pump-and-dump manipulation in stock markets, cryptocurrency 
pump-and-dumps do not rely on information asymmetry and uncertainty about the value of the 
manipulated security—manipulators openly declare their intentions to manipulate particular 
coins. These manipulations also do not rely on asymmetry in price impacts like in standard trade-
based manipulation of stocks. Rather, our evidence suggests that cryptocurrency pump-and-
dumps are akin to a gambling game in which players compete to buy a pumped coin ahead of 
others and sell out ahead of others, near the peak, before the price collapses. We show that 
rational individuals with correct beliefs would not participate in cryptocurrency pumps (unless 
they have an advantage over other participants) as they constitute a negative-sum game. 
However, individuals with gambling preferences would participate under certain conditions and 
so too would overconfident individuals that overestimate their ability to sell near the peak price. 
We find empirical support for both of these explanations for why people participate in pumps.  
Despite the finding that many pump participants treat them as a form of game or 
gambling, cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps nevertheless constitute market manipulation as they 
involve trading and actions (inducing others to trade) undertaken with the intention to influence 
the price of a traded security (see Fox, Glosten, and Rautherberg (2018) and Putniņš (2020) for a 
discussion of what constitutes market manipulation). Currently, a lack of regulation and 
enforcement, as well as weak or absent oversight from exchanges, allows this form of 
manipulation to persist and flourish. For example, we find well over 300 cases of cryptocurrency 
pump-and-dump manipulation in the space of a mere seven months. If regulators and exchanges 
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continue to turn a blind eye, cryptocurrency pump-and-dumps are likely to continue. If left 
unchecked, widespread manipulation in cryptocurrency markets can lead to a loss of confidence 
in these markets and in the technology of tokenization more broadly. Stunted adoption of what is 
potentially a very promising technological development in finance could have substantial 
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Aggregate trading and manipulation on cryptocurrency exchanges  
This table reports descriptive statistics for the trading activity and prevalence of pump-and-dump manipulation on 
two cryptocurrency exchanges (Binance and Yobit) between December 2017 and June 2018. Panel A statistics are 
calculated for all coins listed on both exchanges during the sample period. Panel B statistics are calculated only for 
pumped coins. A “pump-day” refers to a day in which there is at least one manipulation. Pre-pump volume is the 
trading volume in a manipulated coin in the two hours preceding the release of the pump signal. Manipulators’ profit 
is calculated as the difference between the volume-weighted average price during the pump (from start to peak) and 




Panel A: Market activity  
Total coins 1,307 
Total trading volume ($ million) 19,788.12 
Panel B: Manipulation activity  
Total number of pumps 355 
Number of pumped coins 197 
Average pumps per pumped coin 1.80 
Number of pump-days 133 
Average pumps per pump-day 2.67 
Total pump-day volume ($ million) 350.77 
Total pre-pump volume ($ million) 24.38 
Manipulators’ total profit ($ million) 6.04 






Characteristics of pump-and-dump manipulations 
This table reports statistics describing the characteristics of the sample of 355 pump-and-dump manipulations. Pump 
duration, return, and volume statistics are calculated from the start of a pump (the release of the pump signal) to the 
peak price observed during the pump. A “pump-day” refers to a day in which there is at least one manipulation. 
Manipulators’ percentage profit from a pump is calculated as the difference between the volume-weighted average 
price during the pump (from start to peak) and the volume-weighted average price in the two hours preceding the 
release of the pump signal. Manipulators’ dollar profit is calculated as their percentage profit multiplied by the pre-
pump volume (volume in the two hours preceding the release of the pump signal). The sample consists of 355 






Pump duration (minutes) 8.07 21.27 1.54 
Pump return (%) 65.47% 84.44% 34.75% 
Pump return (number of standard deviations of 
the coin’s daily returns) 
4.01 5.27 2.01 
Pump volume (% of pump-day volume) 38.77% 24.22% 39.22% 
Pump-day volume (% of the coin’s average daily 
volume) 
1,351% 1,978% 628% 
Manipulators’ profit (%) 49.02% 47.72% 39.36% 






Determinants of pump participation 
This table reports regression results testing the determinants of participation in pump-and-dump manipulations. The 
dependent variable, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the log total trading volume during pump 𝑗 in coin 𝑖 on day 𝑡, measured 
from the release of the pump signal to three hours after the pump’s peak price is reached. 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the 
average percent return in the two most recent pumps organized by the Telegram groups participating in the pump. 
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡  is the log daily dollar revenue of Bitcoin gambling services after removing the effects of cryptocurrency 
market activity. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the log of intraday volatility for the coin on day 𝑡 − 1 (the difference between the 
highest and lowest trade prices scaled by the volume-weighted average price). For missing values of lagged 
volatility, we use the average volatility for the coin. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the log number of Telegram groups 
participating in the pump. 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the log number of members in these Telegram groups. 𝑌𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖 is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the coin is traded on the Yobit exchange. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  is the log average daily 
dollar trading volume of the coin. The sample consists of 355 manipulations on two exchanges (Binance and Yobit) 
between December 2017 and June 2018. 𝑡-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard 
errors are clustered by coin and day. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable = 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 0.57*** 
(4.89) 
















































      
Week fixed effects Yes No No No No 
𝑅2 87.58% 77.72% 21.51% 77.45% 23.80% 






Determinants of pump outcomes 
This table reports regression results testing how pump participation, participant experience, and liquidity affect 
manipulators’ profit, pre-pump volume, pump return, and pump duration. The unit of observation is a pump 𝑗 in coin 
𝑖 on day 𝑡. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the manipulators’ log dollar profit from the pump, calculated as the difference 
between the volume-weighted average price during the pump (from start to peak) and the volume-weighted average 
price in the two hours preceding the release of the pump signal, multiplied by the trading volume in the two hours 
leading up to the pump. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the log dollar trading volume in the two hours preceding the release of 
the pump signal. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑖 is the percentage price change from the time of the pump signal to the peak of the pump. 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the number of seconds from the release of the pump signal to the peak of the pump. 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
 is the log total dollar trading volume from the start of the pump to three hours after the pump’s 
peak price is reached. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is a proxy for participant experience in the pump, calculated as the log 
average number of pumps conducted before pump 𝑗 by Telegram groups participating in pump 𝑗. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  is the 
log average daily dollar trading volume of the coin. The sample consists of 355 manipulations on two exchanges 
(Binance and Yobit) between December 2017 and June 2018. 𝑡-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Standard errors are clustered by coin and day. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by 
*, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = 

























     
𝑅2 84.47% 86.51% 27.38% 6.88% 





Characteristics of pumped coins 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions examining the characteristics of coins that are more likely to be 
pumped. The unit of observation is a coin 𝑖. The dependent variable, 𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖, an indicator that equals one if the 
coin is pumped at least once during the sample period. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖 is the log of the coin’s average market 
capitalization in dollars. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑄1𝑖 , 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑄2𝑖 , and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑄3𝑖  are indicator variables that equal one if the coin 
is in the first (lowest), second, or third quartile by average daily number of trades. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑄1𝑖, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑄2𝑖 , and 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑄3𝑖  are indicator variables that equal one if the coin is in the first (lowest), second, or third quartile by 
average daily dollar trading volume. The sample includes all coins on the Binance and Yobit exchanges from 
December 2017 to June 2018. Chi-square statistics are in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard 
errors are clustered by coin. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable = 𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖 
























𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑄1𝑖    
-1.10*** 
(-2.92) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑄2𝑖    
1.44*** 
(6.24) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑄3𝑖    
0.92*** 
(3.85) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 7.55% 5.36% 7.81% 






Effects of pump-and-dump manipulations 
This table reports regression results testing how volume, return, and volatility are impacted by pump-and-dump manipulations. The unit of observation is a coin-
day, 𝑖, 𝑡. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the log dollar trading volume. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage return for the coin from day 𝑡 − 1 to day 𝑡 + 2. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the log of 
intraday volatility for the coin on day 𝑡 (the difference between the highest and lowest trade prices scaled by the volume-weighted average price). The 
independent variable of interest is 𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡, which equals one if there is a pump for the given coin on the given day and zero otherwise. 𝑌𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖 is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the coin is listed on the Yobit exchange. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖  is the log of the coin’s average dollar market capitalization. Panel A displays the 
results for the exchange that is the target of the manipulation. Panel B displays the results for all exchanges on which the manipulated coin is listed except the 
target exchange. The sample includes coins targeted in 355 manipulations on two exchanges (Binance and Yobit) from December 2017 to June 2018. 𝑡-statistics 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by coin and day. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
   Dependent variable =   
 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡   𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 

















































            
Coin fixed effects No Yes No  No Yes No  No Yes No 
Day fixed effects No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
𝑅2 82.23% 4.13% 69.34%  0.39% 0.00% 0.23%  2.32% 2.48% 2.63% 
Observations 14,542 24,816 14,542  14,542 24,814 14,542  13,295 20,826 13,295 


































            
Coin fixed effects No Yes No  No Yes No  No Yes No 
Day fixed effects No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
𝑅2 55.76% 0.00% 59.52%  0.14% 0.00% 0.14%  1.18% 0.09% 1.19% 













Figure 1. Sample messages sent on the ‘Big Pump Signal’ Telegram group. 
This figure shows messages sent by the administrators of the Telegram group ‘Big Pump Signal’ to its members. In these messages, the administrators announce 
the date, time, and exchange for a pump in advance of the actual pump (top left-hand-side message). Then, at the commencement of the pump, the group’s 
administrators send the pump signal by releasing the name of the coin being pumped (bottom left-hand-side message). In this illustration, the coin being pumped 
is ‘CHAT’, as indicated by the red dashed line around the text ‘CHAT’. The administrators also provide tips to pump participants on how to profit from pumps 
(right-hand-side message). The group’s administrators advise members to enter the pump as soon as possible and dump their holdings on outsiders who are likely 




Panel A: Price movement for ChatCoin before, during, and after the ‘Big Pump Signal’ pump 
 
Panel B: Trading volume for ChatCoin before, during, and after the ‘Big Pump Signal’ pump 
 
Panel C: Magnified price movement graph for ChatCoin during the ‘Big Pump Signal’ pump 
 
Figure 2. Price and volume for ChatCoin during the ‘Big Pump Signal’ pump.  
The pump signal for the ChatCoin pump was sent by the administrators of the ‘Big Pump Signal’ group at 20:00:23 
GMT on June 10, 2018. Panel A shows the prices (in cents) for ChatCoin in 15-second intervals between 19:45 
GMT and 21:30 GMT on June 10, 2018, i.e., from 15 minutes prior to the pump signal to 90 minutes after the 
signal. Panel B shows the trading volume ($ thousands) in ChatCoin in five-minute intervals. Panel C shows the 
prices (in cents) for ChatCoin in a narrower window, between 19:58 GMT and 20:03 GMT on June 10, 2018, i.e., 





















































































































































Figure 3. Price dynamics in the theoretical framework.  
The figure illustrates price paths during pumps based on the theoretical framework. For the baseline illustration, we 
set initial price 𝑃0 = $5, number of manipulators 𝑀 = 10, number of participants 𝑁′ = 100, and price impact 
parameter 𝛽 = 0.2. In the high 𝑀 specification, we increase the number of manipulators to 𝑀 = 100, keeping all 
other parameters at their baseline levels. In the high 𝑁′ specification, we increase the number of participants to 
𝑁′ = 600, keeping all other parameters at their baseline levels. In the high 𝛽 specification, we increase the price 































Figure 4. Exit price distributions for fast and slow individuals. 
This graph plots the probability density functions (pdf) of exit prices (the prices at which a pump participant expects 
to close their long position) for fast and slow participants. In this illustration, we use the following parameter values: 
initial price 𝑃0 = $5, number of manipulators 𝑀 = 2, number of participants 𝑁′ = 100, and price impact 𝛽 = 0.01. 
Assuming an equal proportion of fast and slow agents, the exit price distribution for the average participant is 
uniform. Fast (slow) agents have a high (low) probability of receiving high exit prices and a low (high) probability 
of receiving low exit prices. The speed parameter, 𝑆, is the slope of the transformed pdf. 𝑆 takes the value 𝑠∗(𝑠∗ >
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Panel A: Participation region for different levels of overconfidence (𝜺 









Panel B: Participation region for different levels of overconfidence (𝜺 










Panel C: Participation region for different levels of overconfidence (𝜺 














Figure 5. Pump-and-dump participation thresholds as a function of overconfidence and other parameters.  
This figure plots the minimum overconfidence level (  
𝑚𝑖𝑛) above which individuals choose to participate in pump-
and-dump manipulation games. Panel A plots this overconfidence threshold for different values of the price impact 
parameter (𝛽). Panel B plots the threshold for different values of the manipulators’ pre-pump long position (𝑀).  
Panel C plots the threshold for different values of the number of non-manipulators (𝑁′). In all three plots, the shaded 
area is the region in which individuals participate in the pump. To plot the graphs, for illustrative purposes, we use 
the following parameter values: price impact parameter 𝛽 = 0.1, number of manipulators 𝑀 = 10, and number of 































































































































































Figure 6. Gambler’s expected value from pumps for different parameter values. 
The figure plots the expected value from participating in pumps for an individual with Cumulative Prospect Theory 
preferences (vertical axis). The horizontal axis is the price impact parameter (𝛽) in Panel A, the manipulators’ pre-
pump long position (𝑀) in Panel B, and the number of non-manipulators (𝑁′) in Panel C. For illustrative purposes, 
we set the price impact parameter 𝛽 = 0.1, number of manipulators 𝑀 = 10, number of non-manipulator 
participants 𝑁′ = 250, and initial wealth 𝑎 = $6. We set the Cumulative Prospect Theory parameters as follows: 
value adjustment parameter 𝛼 = 0.95, probability weighting parameter 𝛿 = 0.5, and loss aversion parameter 




Panel A: Return during pumps 
 
 
Panel B: Volume during pumps 
 
 
Figure 7. Return and volume dynamics during pump-and-dump manipulations. 
The figure plots average cumulative returns (Panel A) and average cumulative volumes (Panel B) before, during, 
and after a pump signal (𝑡 = 0). The cumulative returns and volumes are measured in 15-second intervals from 15 
minutes (900 seconds) before the pump signal until 45 minutes (2,700 seconds) after the pump signal. Cumulative 
volume is measured as a percentage of the total trading volume from 15 minutes before the pump signal until 45 
minutes after the pump signal. The sample includes 355 pumps on the Binance and Yobit exchanges between 

















































Panel A: Number of pumps and Bitcoin price through time 
 
Panel B: Pump returns and Bitcoin price through time 
 
Panel C: Past pump return and pump volume through time 
 
Figure 8. Pump dynamics through time. 
Panel A plots the daily number of pumps and the volume-weighted average Bitcoin price. Panel B plots the average 
return on pumps (from pump start to peak) on a given day and the volume-weighted average Bitcoin price. Panel C 
plots the average return for the two most recent pumps conducted by the pump groups responsible for the pumps on 
a given day (our proxy for participant overconfidence) alongside the total trading volume during the pumps on that 
given day (our proxy for pump participation). All variables are smoothed using a ten-day moving average. The 
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